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ABSTRACT 
The use of public diplomacy is an essential component of counterterrorism efforts but, to 
date, the United States has not been as effective in its attempts to utilize strategic 
communication against the threat of violent Islamic extremism as it has been in its 
utilization of military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources.  Based upon the idea 
that a retrospective analysis of previous presidential speeches could provide guidance for 
future strategic communications of U.S. government officials, this thesis identifies the 
nature of the message delivered by U.S. presidents to foreign audiences since the 9/11 
attacks through a qualitative analysis of a purposeful sampling of 50 speeches and 
statements.  The analysis examines the position of the United States government in the 
ideological debate with violent Islamic extremists to determine whether the United States 
has taken a largely defensive stance, in which the United States constantly strives to 
counter the narrative of violent extremist adversaries, or a more forward-leaning posture, 
in which the United States remains primarily concerned with presenting its own narrative 
based on its values and ideals.  The results of this analysis are then utilized to offer 
recommendations on modifying the message to better support U.S. efforts to combat 
violent Islamic extremism. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has engaged in extensive 
military, intelligence, and law enforcement action against the terrorist threat in the global 
arena.  These primarily tactical and reactive efforts of defense, detection, and deterrence 
have contributed to the protection of the country and its interests, but have not fully 
confronted the ideological foundation on which the threat is based.  This thesis continued 
the increased focus on public diplomacy as a vital tool in the counterterrorism efforts of 
the United States through a qualitative analysis of speeches given by sitting U.S. 
Presidents to foreign audiences.  Through this analysis, the position of the United States 
Government in the ideological conversation was examined to determine whether the 
United States has taken a largely defensive stance, in which the United States constantly 
strives to counter the narrative of violent extremist adversaries, or a more forward-
leaning posture, in which the United States remains primarily concerned with presenting 
its own narrative based on its values and ideals. 
The qualitative analysis was conducted on a purposeful sampling of 50 speeches 
and statements given by Presidents Bush and Obama to foreign audiences in the years 
since 9/11.  The examination of themes and patterns in the words and phrases used by the 
presidents identified the nature of the message delivered by the presidents, differences in 
the nature of the message between presidential administrations, and how this message can 
be modified to best support the U.S. in its efforts to combat violent Islamic extremism. 
Each speech was evaluated and relevant excerpts were determined to be either a 
reactive counter narrative in response to the messages of violent Islamic extremists or a 
proactive narrative based on the views of the United States.  One of four codes was then 
applied to each excerpt as appropriate: for counter narrative messages, either Countering 
Perceptions or Undermining Adversarial Leadership; for narrative messages, either 
Positive Vision Based on America’s Values or Cultivating Common Interests and Values 
with the United States.  The analysis calculated the number of occurrences of each code 
in the speeches and statements, as well as the relative weight given to each code within 
each speech.  An Intensity Index, based on a scale of 0 to 1.0, was utilized to demonstrate 
 xiv 
this relative weight and was calculated by dividing the number of instances of each code 
by the total number of coded excerpts within the speech. 
Based on the review of speeches and statements as well as the analysis of the 
frequency and relative weight afforded to each code, the research determined the message 
delivered by the presidents to foreign audiences since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to be of a 
primarily narrative nature.  Less than half of all total speeches and statements contained 
excerpts of a counter narrative nature (either Countering Perceptions and Undermining 
Adversarial Leadership); rather, the majority of the remarks included at least one 
occurrence of a narrative message with 86% containing excerpts with the Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code and 66% containing excerpts with the 
Positive Vision Based on America's Values code.  Within the speeches and statements 
containing these codes, the excerpts with the Common Interests and Values with the 
United States code were given a greater relative weight (0.69) compared to those with the 
Positive Vision Based on America's Values code (0.28).  
The usage of codes and their corresponding relative weights was also analyzed 
based on the type of remarks in which the messages appeared.  The primary message of 
planned speeches in front of a foreign audience was based on Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States, with 100% of the speeches including at least 
one excerpt under this code.  The corresponding average relative weight for the 
Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States code within these 
speeches was the highest of any code at 0.73. 
Only 36% of statements made by the presidents in response to a significant 
national security event, such as a terrorist attack involving American citizens or interests 
or the death of an adversary, contained at least one excerpt with the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code.  Instead, these remarks focused on 
messages aimed to undermine the adversary.  Such statements exhibited both a high 
frequency (90%) and relative weight (0.70) of the Undermining Adversarial Leadership 
code. 
 xv 
Overall, the message delivered to foreign audiences by Bush and Obama was 
relatively consistent.  The message utilized with the greatest frequency and given the 
greatest relative weight by both presidents were those under the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code, with Obama employing this type of 
message more than Bush.  Both presidents employed messages of Countering 
Perceptions and Positive Vision Based on America’s Values on a comparable basis and 
with a similar relative weight.  The primary difference between the administrations was 
in regard to the code of Undermining Adversarial Leadership.  This type of message was 
the only code used with greater frequency and given a higher relative weight by Bush 
than Obama.  
The research demonstrated that the United States puts forth messages of its own 
narrative with higher frequency and relative weight than messages of a counter narrative 
nature.  Based on these results, the United States should continue its efforts to present its 
own narrative; however, to achieve a more effective holistic approach to public 
diplomacy and strategic communication, it should also take greater advantage of 
opportunities to increase its use of counter narrative messages that contest perceptions 
and undermine the adversary.  While the presidents have utilized such messages in their 
responses to national security events, the counter narrative can be employed on more 
occasions. 
In addition to the recommendation to modify this message by more consistently 
including messages aimed at countering perceptions and undermining the adversary, the 
United States can take additional steps to strengthen its public diplomacy strategy 
through greater coordination with Muslim partners as well as with other governments to 
present a united voice to effectively combat the ideology of violent Islamic extremists.  
Strong international partnerships can help to reinforce valuable themes, thereby 
increasing global assistance in counterterrorism efforts and decreasing the appeal of the 
violent Islamic extremist narrative. 
 xvi 




Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every  
day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training  
and deploying against the U.S.?  
 
Donald Rumsfeld1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
As another presidential term gets under way in 2013, and despite a political 
campaign in which national security largely took a backseat to issues of the economy and 
healthcare, the United States still finds itself facing a formidable adversary in violent 
Islamic extremism even after the massive counterterrorism efforts that have been 
expended over more than a decade.  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States has engaged in extensive military, intelligence, and law enforcement action against 
the terrorist threat in the global arena.  These primarily tactical and reactive efforts of 
defense, detection, and deterrence have contributed to the protection of the country and 
its interests, but have not fully confronted the ideological foundation on which the threat 
is based.  As a result, the United States continues to face individuals and groups seeking 
to do harm to its citizens, its government, and its interests.   
Despite the detention or death of numerous senior leaders as well as rank and file 
members of the al Qa’ida organization and its affiliates, a realization has taken place that 
the capture or elimination of individuals is not adequate enough to quell the threat.  The 
ideology that forms the foundation of justification for the violence continues to keep its 
hold among vulnerable populations, and remains resilient to the important but insufficient 
kinetic response of the United States.2  As a result, the traditional practices of arresting 
                                                 
1 Donald Rumsfeld as quoted in Michael Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases 
of Terrorist Dropouts,” Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism), January 2010, 73, accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf. 
2 Frank J. Cilluffo, J. Scott Carpenter, and Matthew Levitt, “What’s the Big Idea? Confronting the 
Ideology of Islamist Extremism,” The George Washington Homeland Security Policy Institute and The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 4, 2011, accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4d4eb93e776a6.pdf. 
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and killing operatives appear to have little effect on countering the radicalization 
campaign by which violent Islamic extremism builds its support network.3    
The use of “soft-power,” such as public diplomacy, to counter the ideology and 
narrative of violent extremism has been increasingly recognized as essential in any 
counterterrorism efforts.  In its 2009 report, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy advised that countering the ideology that drives extremism is “a critical element in 
the overall effort to prevent and defeat the violence that emerges from it.”4  However, 
despite the recognition of its value and necessity to fully combat the terror threat, an 
effective approach largely has remained an enigma within the national security strategy 
of the United States.  Lacking such a successful coordinated effort to contest the 
attraction of the radical narrative, there then appears to be no finite number of terrorists.5 
This is not the first time in which the United States has had to pursue a 
communication strategy through public diplomacy in its efforts to dismantle a threat.  
Throughout the Cold War, the United States engaged in a war of ideas that proved to be 
vital in its victory over the Soviet Union.6  Those efforts were coordinated through the 
United States Information Agency (USIA), an independent foreign affairs agency within 
the executive branch whose purpose was to explain and support American foreign policy 
and to promote U.S. national interests through a range of overseas information 
programs.7  After the fall of the Communist Bloc, this purpose also subsided.  The USIA 
was disbanded in 1999 and its responsibilities absorbed by entities within the U.S. 
                                                 
3 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, “Highlighting al-Qaeda's Bankrupt Ideology,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policywatch 1371 (May 7, 2008), accessed October 24, 2009, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/highlighting-al-qaedas-bankrupt-ideology. 
4 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for 
Counterradicalization,” March 2009, 1, accessed October 24, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org 
/uploads/Documents/pubs/PTF2-Counterradicalization.pdf. 
5 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement 
(New York: Routledge, 2009). 
6 Helle C. Dale, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications Review: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight,” The Heritage Foundation, March 22, 2010, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/public-diplomacy-and-strategic-communications-review-
key-issues-for-congressional-oversight. 
7 University of Illinois at Chicago, “United States Information Agency Fact Sheet,” February 1999, 
accessed November 19, 2012, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm. 
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Department of State (DOS).  Since that time, the function of public diplomacy has been 
largely viewed as less important than political and military missions.8   
Despite this relegation, and especially after the 9/11 attacks, the United States still 
has a continued need to promote and defend its ideas.9  In the years since 2001, the 
United States has initiated and pursued a variety of public diplomacy endeavors in its 
attempt to construct an alternative narrative.  Early initiatives were based around 
advertising campaigns, listening tours, and celebrity goodwill ambassadors, all serving to 
sell the American brand by portraying a more positive view of the United States to the 
rest of the world.10  Many of the proposals and policies have looked to individuals and 
entities outside of the U.S. government to present an alternative narrative to violent 
Islamic extremism.  A common refrain heard throughout relevant discussions is that the 
United States must “empower mainstream Muslim voices,”11 but there is little guidance 
on the actual practical meaning of this phrase or what is to be done with these voices 
once they are empowered.  Another similar and oft-repeated suggestion is that those 
involved in U.S. counterterrorism efforts should “solicit the interest and support of 
religious and cultural leaders in community dialogue.”12  The importance of such 
engagement with Muslim community and religious leaders here in the United States 
cannot be overstated; however, once again, these suggestions lack a clear explanation of 
how their interest and support can be most optimally utilized to combat the violent 
Islamic extremist narrative on a global scale.  In recent years, a greater emphasis has been 
placed on the domestic front to combat homegrown radicalization.  In 2011, the Obama 
Administration introduced its counter radicalization strategy entitled “Empowering Local 
                                                 
8 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and 
the 9/11 Commission Recommendations, by Susan Epstein, CRS Report RL32607 (June 1, 2010), accessed 
October 21, 2012, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/40146.pdf.       
9 Robert R. Reilly, “Ideas Matter: Restoring the Content of Public Diplomacy” The Heritage 
Foundation Special Report 64 (July 27, 2009), 1, accessed October 21, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/07/ideas-matter-restoring-the-content-of-public-diplomacy. 
10 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Rewriting the Narrative,” 11. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, “Radicalization or Rehabilitation: 
Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners,” RAND Corporation, 2008, 53, 
accessed October 25, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR571. 
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Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” and its corresponding 
Strategic Implementation Plan, outlining the U.S. Government’s support of local 
communities in efforts to prevent extremism that leads to violence.13         
Contrary to the counter narrative strategies referenced above, in which outside 
voices are utilized to present the message, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) advocated a type of strategic 
communication plan in which the U.S. government itself communicated with the world.  
Among its findings, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government “must 
define what the message is, what it stands for” and “must do more to communicate its 
message.”14  The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation also differed by positioning the 
U.S. government on the offensive, promoting its own message, instead of on the 
defensive, reacting to and countering the narrative of others. 
Whether this recommendation has been implemented is debatable.  As seen in the 
campaign leading up to the recent presidential election, words and statements are viewed 
through very different prisms on each side of political party lines.  For example, those in 
his own Democratic party viewed speeches given to foreign audiences by President 
Obama in his first term as diplomatic achievements, but Republicans described the same 
speeches as “an apology tour.”   
Regardless of politics, the manner in which the U.S. government communicates 
with the rest of the world is vital to explain its policies and present the values on which 
America stands.15  As the span of the globe shrinks due to technological advances, 24/7 
news coverage, and the rise of social media, vigilance about foreign attitudes and views 
of America is as important as its military strength.16  However, U.S. government policies 
 
                                                 
13 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: White House, August 2011). 
14 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (Philip Zelikow, Executive 
Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor), The 9/11 Commission Report (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 376–377. 
15 Dale, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications Review.” 
16 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
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and proposals for public diplomacy and strategic communication since the 9/11 attacks 
have received scathing criticism, have proved futile, and have been continuously 
overhauled.17    
To date, the United States has not been effective in its attempts to utilize public 
diplomacy and strategic communication against the threat of violent Islamic extremism.  
The United States has not been able to halt the infinite line of individuals willing to 
follow the ideology of violent Islamic extremism and participate in violent activity on its 
behalf, nor has it been able to put forth a consistent message or narrative of its own.  
Absent such a message to define the United States in its own terms, the violent extremists 
provide their own characterization of America.18  The possible resulting negative foreign 
public opinion about the United States could affect the amount of assistance received 
from other countries to combat the threat of violent extremism, and could increase the 
recruitment efforts of terrorist groups.19 
The efforts of the military, intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies 
have been successful in the detection and disruption of terrorist activity, but have not 
adequately addressed the ideology behind that violent activity.  In response to former 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s question that began this section, the United States has 
captured and killed many terrorists.  Whether we are deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists than are being recruited and trained is yet to be determined. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
While there are differing opinions on the effectiveness of the government as the 
messenger of strategic communications, the United States cannot wholly surrender its 
role.  Instead, the U.S. government must recognize and acknowledge the difficulties 
encountered in its attempts to counter the narrative of violent Islamic extremism, to 
                                                 
17 Christopher Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and 
Recommendations,” RAND Corporation, 2009, iii, accessed October 21, 2012, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP250.pdf. 
18 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
377. 
19 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
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include the obstacles inherent in its role as the messenger, and continue to be an active 
participant in the dialogue.  The U.S. government must be an active voice to make known 
its official position and avoid misrepresentation of that position by its adversaries.20  The 
determination of who within the government is best suited to present that message is yet 
another factor in establishing a valuable public diplomacy program.21  There are many 
representatives of the United States government in the global span of political and 
diplomatic efforts.  From U.S. Ambassadors in all countries with which the United States 
has diplomatic relations to U.S. cabinet members including the Secretary of State, the 
United States has many emissaries to present the views and perspectives of the nation; 
however, only the president commands overflowing crowds in city squares and receives 
the most significant media attention for each word spoken (for example, in addition to the 
3,000 invited guests to his 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt, President Barack Obama had an 
additional audience of tens of millions through television, internet, and social 
networking).22  Only the president is the United States’ “communicator-in-chief.”23  
Therefore, this thesis will continue the increased focus on public diplomacy as a vital tool 
in the counterterrorism efforts of the United States through an analysis of speeches given 
by sitting U.S. Presidents to foreign audiences, and will include consideration of the 
following research questions: 
• What is the nature of the message delivered by U.S. Presidents to foreign 
audiences since the 9/11 terrorist attacks? 
• Has the nature of this message differed between presidential 
administrations? 
• Can this message be modified to better support U.S. efforts to combat 
violent Islamic extremism and, if so, how?  
                                                 
20 Council on Foreign Relations, “Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War Against 
Terrorism,” Independent Task Force Report 38 (November 6, 2001), accessed October 29. 2012, 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/improving-us-public-diplomacy-campaign-war-against-terrorism/p4215. 
21 Michael Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts,” 
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism), January 2010, 73, 
accessed September 3, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org 
/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf. 
22 Scott Wilson, “Obama Calls On Muslims for a 'New Beginning' With U.S.,” Washington Post, June 
5, 2009, accessed November 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/04/AR2009060401024.html. 
23 Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication?” 5. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The examination of these communications will provide a better understanding of 
what has been done, and what should be done, to craft an effective narrative for the 
United States in hopes of reducing the attractiveness of the violent Islamic extremist 
ideology.  This research will examine the position of the United States government in the 
ideological conversation to determine whether the United States has taken a largely 
defensive stance, in which the United States constantly strives to counter the narrative of 
violent extremist adversaries, or a more forward-leaning posture, in which the United 
States remains primarily concerned with presenting its own narrative based on its values 
and ideals.  In doing so, this research will contribute to shifting the discussion from local 
domestic initiatives, in which individuals outside the government are relied upon to 
promote an alternative narrative to violent Islamic extremism, to a global perspective, in 
which the United States Government presents a consistent message from its leaders on 
the world stage. Such research will be of importance to academics in the homeland 
security field, homeland security policymakers, and the Executive Branch of the United 
States Government as potential new perspectives are introduced through which lessons 
can be learned regarding the construction and expression of a consistent national 
narrative and global message.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is an understandably broad realm of literature addressing the type of 
message that has been presented by the United States in its efforts to combat violent 
Islamic extremism.  For purposes of this research, and to address the use of public 
diplomacy and strategic communication by the United States, a review of relevant 
literature first must examine the definitions of these terms and others.  A review of the 
literature must also take a look at the effectiveness of previous attempts at strategic 
communication by the United States.  Lastly, to clearly characterize the nature of 
previous U.S. efforts, the literature review must also look at the role of the government as 
messenger as well the content of its message. 
 8 
1. Definitions 
a. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications 
Available literature differs on the definitions of public diplomacy and 
strategic communication, with some using these terms synonymously and others 
subordinating one term to the other.24  Among the more straightforward and simpler 
definitions, Wolf and Rosen describe public diplomacy as the process of explaining and 
advocating American values to the world.25  Epstein provides a comparable definition, 
stating that public diplomacy is the promotion of the interests, cultures, and policies of 
the United States by informing and influencing foreign populations.26  The U.S. 
government provides a broader description, with DOS stating that the mission of U.S. 
public diplomacy is 
… to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, 
advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and 
influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the 
relationship between the people and government of the United States and 
citizens of the rest of the world.27 
Likewise, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines public diplomacy as  
[t]hose overt international public information activities of the United 
States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy 
objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign 
audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.28    
In many attempts at its definition, public diplomacy is contrasted with 
other related concepts.  In distinguishing it from traditional diplomacy, which is focused 
on dialogue between governments, Amr emphasizes public diplomacy’s communication 
                                                 
24 Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication?” 2. 
25 Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, “Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It,” 
RAND Corporation, 2004, iii, accessed November 18, 2012, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf. 
26 26 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
27 “Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
November 17, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/. 
28 “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 
November 17, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 
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with non-state civil society actors such as the general public, media, and non-
governmental organizations.29  Such a comparison is also made by Beehner, who 
contrasts the government-to-government conduct of traditional diplomacy with the aim of 
public diplomacy towards the general public and influential figures like academics, 
journalists, and business leaders.30  Cull makes the significant distinction between public 
diplomacy and public affairs, stating that engagement by an international actor with a 
foreign public is public diplomacy, while engagement between an actor and its own 
public is public affairs.31  A different contrast between public diplomacy and public 
affairs is made by Reilly, who describes the former as the explanation of American 
principles to foreign audiences and the latter as the explanation of specific American 
policies.32  With still another comparison, the University of Southern California Center 
on Public Diplomacy separates public diplomacy from propaganda by pointing out the 
usually pejorative connotation of the latter.33  Despite this negativity normally associated 
with propaganda, its original meaning shares a similar definition with public diplomacy 
and is described by Bernays as the “mechanism by which ideas are disseminated on a 
large scale… in the broad sense of an organized effort to spread a particular belief or 
doctrine” and a “consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the 
relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.”34   
                                                 
29 Hady Amr, “The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic 
World,” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution Analysis Paper Number 6 
(January 2004): 2, accessed November 18, 2012, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2004/1/01islamicworld%20amr/amr20040101.pdf. 
30 Lionel Beehner, “Perceptions of U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 
29, 2005, accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/media-and-foreign-policy/perceptions-us-
public-diplomacy/p8934?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublication_list%3Fid%3D448. 
31 Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009), 
12, accessed November 18, 2012, 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesLessons.pdf. 
32 Reilly, “Ideas Matter,” 1. 
33 Kristen M. Lord, “Public Engagement 101: What Strategic Communication Is, Isn’t, and Should 
Be,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st quarter 2010): 7, accessed November 18, 2012, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/lord_public_engagement_101.pdf. 
34 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing, 1928). 
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Strategic communication is a concept becoming more widespread after 
years of having been more traditionally associated with the military.  As with public 
diplomacy, the DoD offers a broad definition of strategic communication as  
[f]ocused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key 
audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 
advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and 
objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, 
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 
national power.35 
In 2010, the Obama Administration provided a similar definition of 
strategic communication by referring to  
… (a) the synchronization of words and deeds and how they will be 
perceived by selected audiences, as well as (b) programs and activities 
deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended 
audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public 
diplomacy, and information operations professionals.36 
The definition is simplified by Lord, who describes strategic 
communication as “the promotion of national interests through efforts to inform, engage, 
and influence foreign publics.” 37    
Given the lack of consensus of any clear distinction between public 
diplomacy and strategic communication, and the wide overlap between the two concepts, 
the terms will be used synonymously for the purposes of this research and will refer to 
the promotion of American interests and values to inform and influence foreign 
populations. 
b. Ideology and Narrative 
The term ideology is most often utilized within the definition of the term 
terrorism, such as in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which 
defines terrorism as “often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs.”   
                                                 
35 “DOD Dictionary,” U.S. Department of Defense. 
36 White House, National Strategy for Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: White House, 
2010). 
37 Lord, “Public Engagement 101,” 7. 
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By itself, however, ideology is most simply defined as a set of ideas or beliefs that are 
characteristic of an individual or group.38  Expanding on this definition, the U.S. Army 
and Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that ideology provides a prism through which 
followers can perceive their situation.39 
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual continues on to describe narratives 
as stories that express the values, character, or self-identity of a group, and as the central 
means by which ideologies are expressed and absorbed.  Similarly, according to Sparkes 
and Smith, a narrative is a shared frame comprised of various stories and embedded in 
society, forming the basis of a culture’s identity and actions.40  Such a narrative supports 
a variety of cognitive and communicative activities within a culture or society.41  
For the purposes of this research, the term ideology will refer to a set of 
beliefs; for example, the set of beliefs that form the foundation of violent Islamic 
extremist groups such as al Qa’ida.  The term narrative will refer to the words and 
messages by which that ideology is described. 
2. U.S. Public Diplomacy 
a. Assessment of Efforts to Date 
Numerous authors, experts, and practitioners have concluded that U.S. 
public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts are critical, but currently 
inadequate to meet today’s needs.42  Throughout the years, some have argued, al Qa’ida 
was unchallenged in its strategic communications given the relative quiet of the U.S. 
government in the ideological debate.  This silence may have been attributed to the belief 
                                                 
38 Tom Quiggin, “Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009), accessed January 16, 2011, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/67/html. 
39 Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (December 2006): 1–14.   
40 Andrew C. Sparkes and Brett Smith, “Narrative Constructionist Theory,” in Handbook of 
Constructionist Research, ed. by James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: The Guilford Press). 
41 David Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Marie-Laure Ryan, eds, Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative 
Theory (London: Routledge, 2005), accessed January 26, 2011, http://people.cohums.ohia-
state.edu/herman145/RENT.html. 
42 Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication?” v. 
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that the U.S. government could not be a credible voice, or that government participation 
would elevate the visibility and status of violent Islamic extremists, or perhaps it was a 
result of the lack of a coordinated and sustained effort across the government.43 
Early post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy initiatives, based on efforts to sell 
the American brand through a campaign to portray a positive view of the United States, 
were “widely regarded as ineffective in stemming the tide of radicalization.”44  In 2009, 
Paul conducted a review of recent proposals and recommendations regarding the 
improvement of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication.  The study 
determined that there was extensive support of the need for increased leadership, greater 
coordination, more resources, and further clarity of strategy for U.S. efforts.45  Additional 
studies, dating back to July 2002, have concurred with the assessment that U.S. public 
diplomacy efforts have been hindered by a lack of leadership, poor coordination among 
agencies involved, and minimal resources.46   
The DOS Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), 
established in 2010, has been commended for its work in developing strategic narratives 
for the United States to use to challenge and discredit the violent extremist message.47  
However, the CSCC is most often seen as a reactive program, with defensive terms used 
to describe the CSCC’s work as an explicit counter to the extremist narrative.  
Specifically, Dale declares the CSCC’s digital outreach team as “among its most 
promising initiatives,” but depicts it as a group that “takes the fight to contested media 
websites and forums.”48  Similarly, Levitt describes the CSCC’s mission to “identify, 
                                                 
43 Richard LeBaron, “State Department’s Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” in Finding a 
Balance: U.S. Security Interests and the Arab Awakening, ed. Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Politics Policy Focus 119 (May 2012), 5: 16. 
44 Levitt and Jacobson, “Highlighting al-Qaeda's Bankrupt Ideology.” 
45 Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication?” 4. 
46 Helle C. Dale, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: The Search for a National Strategy,” The Heritage 
Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1029 (February 11, 2008), accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/em1029.cfm. 
47 LeBaron, “State Department’s Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” 16. 
48 Helle C. Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Sticks and Carrots,” The Foundry (blog), 
September 15, 2011, accessed October 29, 2012, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/09/15/u-s-counterterrorism-
strategy-sticks-and-carrots/. 
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confront, and undermine” the communications of violent extremist groups and the use of 
its developed narratives to “rebut and preempt” the adversary’s message.49 
More recently, critiques of the Obama Administration’s 2011 domestically 
focused counter radicalization strategy call attention to the lack of specificity in its 
general language and the absence of any detailed initiatives in its proposals.50  In 
addition, Bjelopera questions whether such a strategy places the federal government in 
the position of deciding which ideas and ideologies are dangerous and which are safe, 
despite the strategy’s attention to the importance of First Amendment concerns.51 
As Reilly observes, there are no sales figures by which to easily measure 
success in public diplomacy.52  The impact of public diplomacy and strategic 
communication efforts are difficult to gauge, with some standards of measurement 
largely based on quantity of interviews and amount of television time of U.S. government 
representatives.53  Furthermore, without clearly defined goals and metrics, these efforts 
are simply a process for which results are measured by the size of its budget.54 
b. The United States Government as Messenger 
A review of relevant literature revealed broad support for a U.S. strategy 
to counter the narrative of violent Islamic extremism,55 but there are varying views on the 
                                                 
49 Richard LeBaron, “State Department’s Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” 15–16. 
50 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Countering Violent Extremism in the 
United States, by Jerome P. Bjelopera, CRS Report RL42553 (May 31, 2013), accessed September 3, 2012. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Reilly, “Ideas Matter,” 22. 
53 U.S. Department of State Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating 
Committee, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, June 2007: 33, 
accessed on October 24, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/public-diplomacy/us-national-strategy-public-
diplomacy-strategic-communication/p13601. 
54 Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
55 Levitt and Jacobson, “Highlighting al-Qaeda's Bankrupt Ideology”; Robert Satloff, The Battle of 
Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004); Paul Shemella, “Reducing Ideological Support for 
Terrorism,” Strategic Insights 8, no. 2 (April 2009), accessed October 24, 2009, 
http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ccc/publications/onlinejournal/2009/apr/shemellaApr09.html; The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Rewriting the Narrative”; Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism 
Strategy.” 
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depth of its potential success based on the role of the U.S. government as the messenger 
of an alternative narrative.  In addition to the basic difficulties that the United States has 
had in previous attempts to refute the violent Islamic extremist narrative, there are 
reasonable arguments that this task is not easily accomplished because of cultural 
differences as well as the fervent nature with which beliefs are held.  A 2009 report by 
Lord, Rosen, and Nagle for the Center for a New American Security states that the battle 
for hearts and minds is not between Muslim societies and the West, but rather within 
Muslim societies because voices from within the culture are far more persuasive than 
those of outsiders.  Likewise, Jacobson stresses the importance of recognizing that 
governments are not always the most effective messengers for presenting the alternative 
narrative.56  The message of the government may be viewed as propaganda, or provide 
fodder for conspiracy theories.57  As stated by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of the Council 
on Foreign Relation’s Public Diplomacy Task Force, the U.S. government must be 
heedful of the basic creed that if one does not trust the messenger, they will not trust the 
message.58     
Epstein also expresses limitations to public diplomacy when the problem 
is based on disagreements with U.S. foreign policies as opposed to misperceptions of the 
United States.59  An additional view expressed by Satloff, focusing on the degree to 
which individuals held extremist views, advised that the United States can do nothing to 
change the beliefs of the most hardened violent extremists.  Rather, Satloff recommended 
that U.S. policy should instead seek defeat of the extremists “through military means for 
those who use violence to gain power, and through political means for those whose 
tactics take a more circuitous path to the same objective.”60  
                                                 
56 Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons.” 
57 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Countering Violent Extremism in the 
United States, 27. 
58 Peter G. Peterson, “Privatising U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 21, 
2004, accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/media-and-public-opinion/privatising-us-public-
diplomacy/p6697. 
59 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
60 Satloff, The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror, p. xiv. 
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c. Content of Message 
There are multiple and varying views on the type of message that should 
be put forth by the U.S. government in its efforts to combat violent Islamic extremism.  
The call for a counter narrative, or a communication strategy based in response to the 
messages of violent Islamic extremists, has been consistent in the years since the 9/11 
attacks.  Those who promote this reactive approach endorse a challenge of ideas, wherein 
the United States confronts the violent extremist ideology with an opposing argument.61  
For example, Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko, and McCauley recommend a minimum of 
four different counter narratives to confront the adversary’s ideology in front of different 
audiences; specifically, these counter narratives must: (1) counter the perception that the 
West is engaged in a war on Islam; (2) counter the perception that violent Islamic 
extremists are defending their religion; (3) counter the perception that the actions of 
violent Islamic extremists are legitimate acts of war; and (4) counter the perception that 
good Muslims have a duty to support the violent extremists.62  To craft a counter 
narrative, Jacobson advocates messages that undermine extremist leadership and diminish 
the leaders’ authority and credibility.63  Echoing the same type of strategy aimed at 
discrediting extremist leaders, Cilluffo, Carpenter, and Levitt recommend negative 
imagery and messages that expose the hypocrisy of violent extremists’ words versus their 
actions.64  One example of this type of approach is the 2006 release by the DoD of video 
of former al Qa’ida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi appearing unfamiliar with the 
operation of a machine gun as well as wearing American brand sneakers.65  Another 
example is an emphasis on the killing of civilians as well as fellow Muslims by violent 
Islamic extremists.66   
                                                 
61 Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy”; Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons.” 
62 Christian Leuprecht, et al, “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and 
Counternarratives Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009), accessed February 2, 2012, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/68/html. 
63 Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons.” 
64 “What’s the Big Idea?” 
65 CNN, “U.S.: Outtakes show al-Zarqawi as poor gunman,” May 4, 2006, accessed November 21, 
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/04/iraq.al.zarqawi/. 
66 Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons,” 76. 
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A strategy to highlight such murders, however, could also be used against 
the United States—for example, if the adversary lays claims of innocent civilian 
casualties resulting from American drone strikes.67  In such instances, when the message 
being delivered by the United States is not consistent with observations (or even 
perceptions) of American activities, the public diplomacy will not be effective.  
Therefore, Epstein advocates for a more proactive approach in which the United States 
clearly and openly explains its foreign policy actions.68 
In 2007, DOS published the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy 
and Strategic Communication under the direction of Karen Hughes, the Undersecretary of 
State for Public Diplomacy during the George W. Bush Administration.  This strategy 
promoted a hybrid approach of both a counter narrative as well as a proactive message 
from the United States through three objectives: to offer a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity, rooted in America’s most basic values; to isolate and undermine violent 
extremists; and to cultivate common interests and values between Americans and people 
throughout the world.69   
Others also endorse a less reactive response by supporting a message 
based on the United States’ beliefs—in other words, a message based on the United 
States’ own ideology and not in response to the ideology of others.  As previously 
discussed, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States identify its message 
based on its values and ideals, and clearly communicate that message to the world.70   
More recently, National Security Council member Quintan Wiktorowicz has stated that 
the United States will combat violent ideologies with “an inclusive, positive narrative.”71 
                                                 
67 Marc Lynch, “Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama,” Center for a New 
American Security, June 2010, accessed October 29, 2012, 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Rhetoric%20and%20Reality_Lynch.pdf. 
68 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
69 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication, 33. 
70 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
376. 
71 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Countering Violent Extremism in the 
United States, 27. 
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Nonetheless, in a recent speech, current Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, 
Tara Sonenshine, acknowledged that the main challenge of public diplomacy is trying to 
explain America.  Sonenshine provided an explanation despite the difficulties of this task, 
saying that  
America is a nation with strong principles and purpose. We’re a country 
whose strengths lie in individual resourcefulness and national resilience. 
We tend to proceed from the notion that each individual has the potential 
to achieve his or her individual dreams or desires, while also contributing 
to the common good. We believe in unlocking human potential through 
access, rights and the human freedom to imagine, to innovate, to inspire, 
to achieve peace and prosperity. We believe in interests, values, and 
security.72 
3. Conclusion 
This examination of literature regarding U.S. public diplomacy and strategic 
communication confirms the need for additional study of this topic area.  Though there 
appears to be a large consensus in regard to the shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy 
efforts in the years since the 9/11 attacks, there also exists uncertainty in the United 
States’ ability to promote a viable alternative narrative.  Despite these deficiencies and 
doubts, however, as Reilly notes, the United States must primarily clarify its message to 
the world.73  
The development of a coherent and effective message must begin with a 
retrospective exploration of previous communications of the United States to the world.  
Since 2001, the importance of words and phrases has been periodically recognized by 
U.S. Administrations.  For example, early in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the George 
W. Bush Administration realized the use of the word “crusade” to describe the U.S. 
military response could be inflammatory towards Islam, given its historically religious 
meaning.74  The 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication recommended that government officials avoid using religious language, 
                                                 
72 “The State of American Public Diplomacy” (remarks, American Security Project, June 28, 2012), 
accessed on November 19, 2012, http://newsroom-magazine.com/2012/executive-branch/state-
department/states-tara-sonenshine-the-challenge-of-public-diplomacy-is-to-explain-america/. 
73 “Ideas Matter.” 
74 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Public Diplomacy. 
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if possible, because “it can mean different things and is easily misconstrued.”75  Years 
later, the Administration of Barack Obama attempted to distinguish itself from its 
predecessor by defining the threat as one emanating from “violent extremism” instead of 
“radical Islam” and eliminating from use the phrase “Global War on Terror.”76  
Though these examples demonstrate that some attention has been paid to the 
content of communications, there has not been any apparent prolonged consistent effort 
to put forth a meaningful message to the world.  While numerous studies have examined 
the organizational structure behind strategic communication efforts, a lesser number have 
focused on the substance contained within those communications.77  As a result, public 
diplomacy efforts will not succeed until its textual content is addressed and a coherent 
message is developed. 
                                                 
75 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication, 25. 
76 Lynch, “Rhetoric and Reality”; Al Kamen, “The End of the Global War on Terror,” The 
Washington Post In the Loop (blog), March 24, 2009, accessed February 17, 2013, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/03/23/the_end_of_the_global_war_on_t.html. 
77 Reilly, “Ideas Matter.” 
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II. ANALYSIS 
[T]oo often since 9/11, the extremists have defined us, not the other way  




1. Qualitative Analysis 
To determine the type of message that has been presented by the U.S. government 
since the 9/11 attacks in its efforts to combat violent Islamic extremism, a qualitative 
analysis will be conducted on a purposeful sampling of speeches and statements given by 
the sitting U.S. President to foreign audiences in the years since 9/11.  This analysis will 
attempt to identify the nature of the message delivered by the U.S. Presidents through an 
examination of themes and patterns in their words and phrases.   
The results of this inquiry will then be examined to address the underlying 
research questions and determine any differences in the nature of the message between 
presidential administrations and how this message can be modified to best support the 
U.S. in its efforts to combat violent Islamic extremism.  
2. Sample Selection 
The speeches and statements selected for this analysis took place in the period 
since the 9/11 attacks in order to evaluate the message of the United States in this 
changed world.  The era of homeland security began at 8:46am EDT on September 11, 
2001, when American Airlines Flight 11 was crashed into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center in New York, NY.  Words and phrases that seem commonplace now—
homeland security, Guantanamo, waterboarding—were unknown to the regular citizen.  
The ensuing years brought attention and costs to national security never before seen in 
                                                 
78 Barack Obama, “The War We Need to Win” (remarks, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Washington, DC, August 1, 2007), accessed October 21, 2012, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf. 
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the history of the United States, and with this increased focus came increased debate 
about the role and actions of the United States in its campaign against terror.   
The selected timeframe also spanned the administrations of both a Republican and 
Democrat U.S. President, thereby allowing for a comparison to determine whether the 
message presented to foreign audiences differed between political affiliations.    
Though certain domestic speeches may garner substantial media coverage around 
the world, the selected sample does not include campaign speeches at which time the 
presidents solely were in the role of candidate; inauguration speeches, which tend to 
consist of over-arching visionary themes; or State of the Union speeches, which are most 
often laundry lists of lofty goals and objectives.  Such speeches are largely crafted 
towards a domestic audience, though the content may reach across the globe with today’s 
technology.  Instead, to best capture the message being presented on an international 
platform, the purposeful sample of speeches focused on those specifically tailored for a 
foreign audience and, preferentially when possible, those in front of audiences comprised 
of student or citizen groups as opposed to limited or restricted audiences of governmental 
bodies or international conferences. In addition, an additional number of statements were 
selected which were made by the president in response to a significant national security 
event, such as a terrorist attack involving American citizens or interests, or the death of 
an adversary.  Although sometimes issued in written form and not verbally delivered, 
these statements were included to provide insight into the language used in reactive 
situations as well as an additional point of comparison with pre-planned speeches in front 
of large audiences.   
Efforts to locate a comprehensive list of speeches given by U.S. Presidents to 
foreign audiences proved arduous.  The best source of information was determined to be 
the Public Papers of the Presidents series published by the Office of the Federal Register 
at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.  Each volume of the Public 
Papers, published twice a year, covers an approximate six-month period and contains the 
papers and speeches of the U.S. President that were issued by the Office of the Press 
Secretary during the specified time period.  To compile the sample needed for this 
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research, each volume covering the relevant time period since the 9/11 attacks was 
reviewed and all speeches made to a foreign audience, or statements made in response to 
a national security event, were extracted.   
Volumes of Public Papers during the last year of the Bush presidency in 2008 
have not yet been published, nor for the most recent years of the Obama presidency in 
2010, 2011, and 2012.  Therefore, all speeches for this time period were obtained from 
the respective White House website covering each administration and reviewed under the 
same process. 
The review of the Public Papers volumes, as well as the White House websites, 
yielded a list of 135 speeches given in front of a foreign audience, or in response to a 
national security event.  Another review was then completed to primarily select those 
speeches that fit the criteria of the purposeful sample for this research; specifically, those 
given in front of foreign audiences comprised of student or citizen groups, as opposed to 
limited or restricted audiences of governmental bodies or international conferences. The 
selection eliminated other overseas speaking events such as press conferences, press 
availabilities, and question and answer sessions with audiences, as well as speeches 
dedicated to a specific and narrow topic (e.g., Obama’s Remarks on the 65th Anniversary 
of D-Day in Normandy, France).  The statements given in response to a national security 
event were also then reviewed to select those events directly impacting American citizens 
or interests, or the death of an adversary.  
Upon completion of this review, a total number of 50 speeches and statements 





Date President City/Country Title as Given79 
9/11/01 Bush Washington, DC Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks 
2/20/02 Bush Dorasan, South Korea Remarks at the Dorasan Train Station 
2/22/02 Bush Beijing, China Remarks in Beijing on Confirmation of the 
Death of Daniel Pearl 
2/22/02 Bush Beijing, China Remarks at Tsinghua University in Beijing 
5/24/02 Bush Moscow, Russia Remarks to Community and Religious Leader 
in Moscow 
11/20/02 Bush Prague, Czech Republic Remarks to the Prague Atlantic Student 
Summit 
11/23/02 Bush Vilnius, Lithuania Remarks to the People of Lithuania 
11/23/02 Bush Bucharest, Romania Remarks to the People of Romania 
5/31/03 Bush Krakow, Poland Remarks to the People of Poland 
7/8/03 Bush Goree Island, Senegal Remarks at Goree Island, Senegal 
10/15/03 Bush Washington, DC Statement on the Terrorist Attack on 
Americans in the Gaza Strip 
10/19/03 Bush Bangkok, Thailand Remarks at the Royal Thai Army Headquarters 
11/19/03 Bush London, UK Remarks at Whitehall Palace 
12/14/03 Bush Washington, DC Address to the Nation on the Capture of 
Saddam Hussein 
5/12/04 Bush Washington, DC Remarks on the Death of Nicholas Berg 
6/18/04 Bush Seattle, Washington Remarks on the Death of Paul Johnson 
                                                 
79 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Federal Register, “Public Papers of the 
Presidents,” http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/publications/presidential-papers.html; The White 
House, President George W. Bush, “Presidential News and Speeches,” http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/; The White House, President Barack Obama, “Speeches and Remarks,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks. 
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Date President City/Country Title as Given79 
6/29/04 Bush Istanbul, Turkey Remarks at Galatasaray University  
12/1/04 Bush Halifax, Canada Remarks in Halifax, Canada 
2/24/05 Bush Bratislava, Slovakia Remarks in Bratislava 
5/7/05 Bush Riga, Latvia Remarks in Riga 
5/10/05 Bush Tbilisi, Georgia Remarks in Freedom Square in Tbilisi 
11/6/05 Bush Brasilia, Brazil Remarks in a Discussion with Young Leaders 
11/16/05 Bush Kyoto, Japan Remarks in Kyoto 
6/8/06 Bush Washington, DC Remarks on the Death of Senior Al Qaida 
Associate Abu Musab Al Zarqawi 
6/21/06 Bush Vienna, Austria Remarks in a Discussion with Foreign 
Students in Vienna 
6/22/06 Bush Budapest, Hungary Remarks  in Budapest 
7/14/06 Bush St. Petersburg, Russia Remarks in a Discussion With Civic Leaders   
11/16/06 Bush Singapore Remarks at the National Singapore University 
11/28/06 Bush Riga, Latvia Remarks at Latvia University 
3/9/07 Bush Sao Paulo, Brazil Remarks Prior to a Discussion With Members 
of the Community in Sao Paulo 
1/13/08 Bush Abu Dhabi, UAE President Bush Discusses Importance of 
Freedom in the Middle East 
8/7/08 Bush Bangkok, Thailand President Bush Visits Bangkok, Thailand 
9/20/08 Bush Washington, DC President Bush Condemns Terrorist Attack in 
Islamabad, Pakistan 
11/28/08 Bush Washington, DC Statement by the President on Horrific Attacks 
in Mumbai 
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Date President City/Country Title as Given79 
4/3/09 Obama Strasbourg, France Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting 
4/5/09 Obama Prague, Czech Republic Remarks in Prague 
4/7/09 Obama Istanbul, Turkey Remarks in a Discussion With Students 
6/4/09 Obama Cairo, Egypt Remarks in Cairo 
7/7/09 Obama Moscow, Russia Remarks by the President at the New 
Economic School Graduation 
11/16/09 Obama Shanghai, China Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town 
Hall Meeting with Future Chinese Leaders 
11/7/10 Obama Mumbai, India Remarks by the President and the First Lady in 
Town Hall with Students in Mumbai, India 
11/10/10 Obama Jakarta, Indonesia Remarks by the President at the University of 
Indonesia 
3/20/11 Obama Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Remarks by the President to the People of 
Brazil 
5/2/11 Obama Washington, DC Remarks by the President on Osama Bin 
Laden 
5/23/11 Obama Dublin, Ireland Remarks by the President at Irish Celebration 
in Dublin, Ireland 
11/4/11 Obama Cannes, France Remarks by President Obama in Honoring the 
Alliance Between the United States and France 
3/26/12 Obama Seoul, Republic of Korea Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk 
University 
4/15/12 Obama Cartagena, Columbia Remarks by President Obama at a Land Titling 
Event 
9/12/12 Obama Washington, DC Remarks by the President on the Deaths of 
U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya 
11/19/12 Obama Rangoon, Burma Remarks by President Obama at the University 
of Yangon 
Table 1.   List of speeches and statements selected for purposeful sample. 
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Of the 50 speeches and statements selected, 34 were delivered by Bush and 16 by 
Obama, resulting in a sample size approximately proportional to their respective time in 
office.  Eleven of the 50 selections were responsive statements made in the aftermath of a 
national security event such as a terrorist attack involving American citizens or interests 
or upon the death of an adversary.  For purposes of comparison, the sample selections 
were also defined according to the geographic location in which they were given, using 
the same regions of the world as delineated by different geographic bureaus of DOS80: 1 
in Africa (sub-Sahara), 11 in East Asia and the Pacific, 20 in Europe and Eurasia, 2 in the 
Near East (North Africa and the Middle East), 1 in South and Central Asia, and 15 in the 
Western Hemisphere.  These descriptive categories are further illustrated in Figure 1.  
                                                 





Figure 1.   A graphic illustration depicting the ratios of characteristics of the research 
sample.  
3. Analytical Process 
Each individual speech was assessed for relevant information using a system of 
codes, defined by Miles and Huberman as “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning 
to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study.”81  Each code 
corresponded to a defined category representing the type of message being presented 
within each speech.  As revealed during the review of pertinent literature, there are 
varying opinions on the recommended nature of the message of the United States, with 
some championing a reactive counter narrative while others endorse a more proactive 
                                                 
81 Qualitative Date Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (2nd Edition) (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1994). 
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message based on the United States’ own values, beliefs, and common traits.  The 
designated categories for the coding used in this qualitative analysis reflect these 
differing recommendations, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Categories of codes used for analysis.  Messages projected in relevant 
excerpts of each selected speech or statement were characterized as a counter 
narrative or a narrative and were labeled with one of four appropriate underlying 
codes.     
Using these codes, each speech was evaluated and relevant excerpts were sorted 
into one of the four subcategories in Figure 2.  Once the message was determined to be 
either a reactive counter narrative in response to the messages of violent Islamic 
extremists or a proactive narrative based on the views of the United States, one of the 
four codes was applied as appropriate. 
• Countering Perceptions  
In accordance with the recommendation of Leuprecht et al., this code was applied 
when the message was a counter narrative that refuted perceptions fueled by the 
adversary’s ideology, such as perceptions that the West is engaged in a war on Islam, 
violent Islamic extremists are defending their religion, the actions of violent Islamic 
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extremists are legitimate acts of war, or good Muslims have a duty to support the violent 
extremists.82   
• Undermining Adversarial Leadership 
This second code under the reactive counter narrative heading was given to 
statements that served to discredit violent extremist leaders by diminishing their authority 
and credibility or by revealing their hypocrisy, as promoted by Jacobson and Cilluffo, 
Carpenter, and Levitt, respectively.83  
• Positive Vision Based on America’s Values 
The 9/11 Commission and others supported a positive message, based on the 
United States’ own views and beliefs.84  All such proactive messages, grounded in the 
United States’ own ideology instead of in response to the ideology of others, were 
therefore categorized under this code.   
• Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States 
The second code for proactive narrative statements was assigned to those 
statements which aimed to cultivate common interests and values between Americans 
and others throughout the world, as recommended as part of the hybrid approach of the 
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.85 
B. ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
1. General Observation 
An analysis of the selected sample revealed a predictable template for all 
speeches, regardless of the speaker.  After the obligatory acknowledgments of hosts and 
guests, and some witty and usually self-deprecating comments, each president often 
included a historical reference about the country in which he was speaking before 
addressing any specific subject matter.  This reference often cited a historical connection 
                                                 
82 “Winning the Battle but Losing the War?” 
83 “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons”; “What’s the Big Idea?” 
84 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report; 
U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication; U.S. 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. 
85 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication. 
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between the host country and the United States, an element that will be addressed later in 
reference to the code of Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States. 
2. Summary of Code Analysis 
A total of 520 excerpts from the selected speeches and statements were tagged 
with one of the four identified codes, with the greatest number labeled with the 
Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States code and the least 
number being given the Countering Perceptions and Undermining Adversarial 
Leadership codes.  The complete breakdown of excerpts by code is illustrated in  
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   A representation of the percentage of total excerpts associated with each 
identified code. 
Table 2 presents a more detailed view of the breakdown of coded excerpts, as it 
provides the number of times each of the four codes appear in each speech.  In addition, 
Table 2 provides a corresponding Intensity Index to demonstrate the relative weight given 
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to each type of code within each speech.  This index is based on a scale of 0 to 1.0, and 
was calculated by dividing the number of instances of each code by the total number of 
coded excerpts within the speech.  These figures will be further examined for each code, 
and comparisons will be conducted between presidents as well as types of remarks 
(speech, or statement in response to an event).  The summary of themes appearing within 
the excerpts under each code also will be discussed in further detail and similar 

























































































































































































































Address to the Nation 
on the Terrorist 
Attacks 0 0 2 0.29 4 0.57 1 0.14 7 
2/20/02 Bush Remarks at the Dorasan Train Station 1 0.17 0 0 3 0.50 2 0.33 6 
2/22/02 Bush Remarks at Tsinghua University in Beijing 1 0.07 0 0 11 0.73 3 0.20 15 
2/22/02 Bush 
Remarks in Beijing on 
Confirmation of the 




Religious Leader in 
Moscow 2 0.17 0 0 2 0.17 8 0.67 12 
                                                 
86 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Federal Register, “Public Papers of the 
Presidents,” http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/publications/presidential-papers.html; The White 
House, President George W. Bush, “Presidential News and Speeches,” http://georgewbush-


























































































































































































































Remarks to the 
Prague Atlantic 
Student Summit 0 0 0 0 1 0.14 6 0.86 7 
11/23/02 Bush Remarks to the People of Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.00 2 
11/23/02 Bush Remarks to the People of Romania 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 2 0.67 3 
5/31/03 Bush Remarks to the People of Poland 3 0.17 0 0 6 0.33 9 0.50 18 
7/8/03 Bush Remarks at Goree Island, Senegal 0 0 0 0 2 0.40 3 0.60 5 
10/15/03 Bush 
Statement on the 
Terrorist Attack on 
Americans in the 
Gaza Strip 0 0 1 0.50 1 0.50 0 0 2 
10/19/03 Bush 
Remarks at the Royal 
Thai Army 
Headquarters 1 0.10 1 0.10 1 0.10 7 0.70 10 
11/19/03 Bush Remarks at Whitehall Palace 3 0.14 3 0.14 5 0.23 11 0.50 22 
12/14/03 Bush 
Address to the Nation 
on the Capture of 
Saddam Hussein 0 0 1 0.25 2 0.50 1 0.25 4 
5/12/04 Bush Remarks on the Death of Nicholas Berg 0 0 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 




University  5 0.33 2 0.13 4 0.27 4 0.27 15 
12/1/04 Bush Remarks in Halifax, Canada 1 0.06 1 0.06 2 0.11 14 0.78 18 
2/24/05 Bush Remarks in Bratislava 0 0 1 0.17 1 0.17 4 0.67 6 
























































































































































































































5/10/05 Bush Remarks in Freedom Square in Tbilisi 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1.00 4 
11/6/05 Bush 
Remarks in a 
Discussion with 
Young Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.00 2 
11/16/05 Bush Remarks in Kyoto 0 0 1 0.07 3 0.21 10 0.71 14 
6/8/06 Bush 
Remarks on the Death 
of Senior Al Qaida 
Associate Abu Musab 
Al Zarqawi 0 0 3 0.75 1 0.25 0 0 4 
6/21/06 Bush 
Remarks in a 
Discussion with 
Foreign Students in 
Vienna 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.25 2 0.50 4 
6/22/06 Bush Remarks  in Budapest 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1.00 8 
7/14/06 Bush 
Remarks in a 
Discussion With 
Civic Leaders   0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.00 2 
11/16/06 Bush 
Remarks at the 
National Singapore 
University 4 0.15 1 0.04 2 0.07 20 0.74 27 
11/28/06 Bush Remarks at Latvia University 2 0.13 4 0.27 1 0.07 8 0.53 15 
3/9/07 Bush 
Remarks Prior to a 
Discussion With 
Members of the 
Community in Sao 




of Freedom in the 
Middle East 1 0.05 4 0.18 5 0.28 12 0.55 22 



























































































































































































































Attack in Islamabad, 
Pakistan 0 0 2 0.67 0 0 1 0.33 3 
11/28/08 Bush 
Statement by the 
President on Horrific 
Attacks in Mumbai 0 0 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 
4/3/09 Obama Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting 1 0.05 0 0 1 0.05 19 0.90 21 
4/5/09 Obama Remarks in Prague 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 1.00 15 
4/7/09 Obama 
Remarks in a 
Discussion With 
Students 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 7 0.87 8 
6/4/09 Obama Remarks in Cairo 5 0.15 3 0.09 5 0.15 20 0.61 33 
7/7/09 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President at the New 
Economic School 
Graduation 4 0.15 2 0.07 4 0.15 17 0.63 27 
11/16/09 Obama 
Remarks by President 
Barack Obama at 
Town Hall Meeting 
with Future Chinese 
Leaders 2 0.13 0 0 3 0.19 11 0.69 16 
11/7/10 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President and the First 
Lady in Town Hall 
with Students in 
Mumbai, India 1 0.09 0 0 0 0 10 0.91 11 
11/10/10 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President at the 
University of 

























































































































































































































Remarks by the 
President to the 
People of Brazil 1 0.09 0 0 0 0 10 0.91 11 
5/2/11 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President on Osama 
Bin Laden 1 0.14 4 0.57 2 0.29 0 0 7 
5/23/11 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President at Irish 
Celebration in Dublin, 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 1 0.11 8 0.89 9 
11/4/11 Obama 
Remarks by President 
Obama in Honoring 
the Alliance Between 
the United States and 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.00 5 
3/26/12 Obama 
Remarks by President 
Obama at Hankuk 
University 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.00 5 
4/15/12 Obama 
Remarks by President 
Obama at a Land 
Titling Event 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 2 0.67 3 
9/12/12 Obama 
Remarks by the 
President on the Deaths 
of U.S. Embassy Staff in 
Libya 0 0 0 0 3 0.75 1 0.25 4 
11/19/12 Obama 
Remarks by President 
Obama at the 
University of Yangon 0 0 0 0 11 0.42 15 0.58 26 
Table 2.   Number of occurrences of codes in speeches and statements, and calculation of 
the Intensity Index to demonstrate the relative weight given to each code within 
each speech.  This Index is based on a scale of 0 to 1.0, and was calculated by 
dividing the number of instances of each code by the total number of coded 
excerpts within the speech. 
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3. Comparisons of Codes by Presidents 
a. Countering Perceptions 
The Countering Perceptions code was least employed during this analysis.  
Of the 41 excerpts tagged with this code, 25 were attributed to Bush and 16 to Obama.  
As illustrated in Figure 4, the 41 excerpts appeared within 20, or 40%, of the total sample 
of speeches and statements.  Bush utilized this type of message in 12, or 35%, of his 34 
speeches and statements within the sample; Obama utilized messages aimed to counter 
perceptions in 8, or 50%, of his 16 sample speeches and statements.  Notably, there were 
no occurrences of the Countering Perceptions code in the six most recent Obama 
speeches within the sample. 
 
Figure 4.   The percentage of speeches and statements that contained at least one 
occurrence of the Countering Perceptions code. 
An examination of the Countering Perceptions Intensity Index of each 
speech and statement containing at least one occurrence of this code revealed an overall 
average rating of approximately 0.13, signifying a low relative weight given to this type 
of message by both presidents.  Bush employed messages of this type on an intermittent 
basis throughout both of his terms in office, with an average Intensity Index of 
approximately 0.15.  Similarly, the average Intensity Index for the use of Countering 
Perceptions in speeches and statements by Obama was 0.10.   
An analysis of the content of the excerpts given the Countering 
Perceptions code revealed that each president utilized this type of message in a different 
manner.  Bush countered perceptions of war and violence brought on by America with 
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statements about the humanitarian efforts of the United States, as shown by the frequent 
use of the words “aid” and “assistance” in the word cloud visualization depicted in Figure 
5.   
 
Figure 5.   Word clouds providing a visualization of word frequency in excerpts from 
Bush, left, and Obama, right, which were assigned the Countering Perceptions 
code.  
Specifically, 11 of the 20 excerpts from Bush speeches referred to such 
efforts, such as his statement during his May 2002 speech in Moscow, Russia, in which 
he said, 
We've got a military we're going to use, if we need to, to defend freedom. 
But on the other hand, we delivered a lot of medicine and a lot of food. 
We hurt thinking not only that the children in Afghanistan could not go to 
school; we cried for the fact that people were starving in the country. We 
have rebuilt schools. We have also provided medicine and food.87 
Bush utilized a similar message in Singapore in November 2006, referring 
to the aid provided by the United States in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami by stating, 
After the tsunami struck in 2004, we quickly dispatched military 
assistance and humanitarian relief to save lives and help devastated 
communities rebuild. By coming to the aid of people in dire need, 
                                                 
87 George W. Bush, “Remarks to Community and Religious Leader in Moscow,” (speech, Moscow, 
Russia, May 24, 2002), accessed February 9, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-
book1/html/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg881.htm. 
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America showed the good heart of our citizens and the depth of our 
friendship in this region.88 
Only one excerpt from an Obama speech cited humanitarian efforts, as he 
acknowledged in his Cairo speech in June 2009 that “military power alone is not going to 
solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” and referenced plans to invest in the 
infrastructure and economy of Afghanistan and Pakistan.89 
Many of the other excerpts from Bush speeches tagged with the 
Countering Perceptions code included references to democracy and its place within 
Muslim cultures, thereby attempting to dispel the notion that democracy is incompatible 
with Islam.  For example, as stated by Bush in November 2003 in London, England, 
We're told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture. 
Yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens 
in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily 
struggles, care little for self-government. Yet the poor especially need the 
power of democracy to defend themselves against corrupt elites.90 
Obama takes a more direct approach with messages aimed to counter 
perceptions.  On three occasions, Obama stated that the United States “is not, and never 
will be, at war with Islam.” 91  In ten other excerpts, Obama described the objectives 
America was not pursuing or similar variations of that theme: 
• “We have no interest in occupying Afghanistan.”92 
                                                 
88 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Singapore University,” (speech, Singapore, November 
16, 2006), accessed February 9, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2006-book2/html/PPP-2006-
book2-doc-pg2086.htm. 
89 Barack Obama, “Remarks in Cairo,” (speech, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009), accessed February 13, 
2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/xml/PPP-2009-book1-Doc-pg760.xml. 
90 George W. Bush, “Remarks at Whitehall Palace,” (speech, London, United Kingdom, November 
19, 2003), accessed February 9, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/html/PPP-2003-
book2-doc-pg1573-2.htm. 
91 Obama, “Remarks in Cairo”; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the University of 
Indonesia,” (speech, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 10, 2010), accessed February 13, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-
indonesia; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden,” (speech, Washington, DC, 
May 2, 2011), accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden. 
92 Barack Obama, “Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting,” (speech, Strasbourg, France, April 3, 2009), 
accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/xml/PPP-2009-book1-Doc-
pg413.xml. 
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• “No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation 
by any other.”93 
• “We seek no bases, nor do we want to control these nations.”94 
• “America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of 
government on any other country, nor would we presume to 
choose which party or individual should run a country.”95 
• “In 2009, a great power does not show strength by dominating or 
demonizing other countries.”96 
• “America will never impose a security arrangement on another 
country.”97 
• “We do not seek to impose any system of government on any other 
nation….”98  
• “And that is why the United States insists we do not seek to 
contain China's rise.”99 
• “And that is why the United States insists we do not seek to 
contain China's rise….”100  
• “And we understand that no one nation should impose its will on 
another.”101 
Obama’s repeated use of the word “impose,” as depicted in the word cloud 
in Figure 5, stood in stark comparison with its use by Bush, as Obama most often utilized 
it when referring to actions not to be taken by the United States.  Bush, on the other hand, 
                                                 
93 Obama, “Remarks in Cairo.” 
94 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation,” (speech, 





98 Barack Obama “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese 





101 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the People of Brazil,” (speech, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, March 20, 2011), accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/20/remarks-president-people-brazil-rio-de-janeiro-brazil. 
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primarily used the same word in reference to the adversary, as will be shown within the 
Undermining Adversarial Leadership code.  
b. Undermining Adversarial Leadership 
The analysis characterized 43 excerpts with the Undermining Adversarial 
Leadership code throughout 23, or 46%, of the sample speeches and statements.  A 
majority of these excerpts (32) were attributed to Bush and appeared in 19, or 56%, of his 
speeches and statements; eleven excerpts from Obama were given this code and came 
from only 4, or 25%, of his speeches and statements (Figure 6).  This was the only code 
utilized on a greater basis by Bush than Obama and, again, there were no occurrences of 
the Undermining Adversarial Leadership code in the six most recent Obama speeches 
within the sample. 
 
Figure 6.   The percentage of speeches and statements that contained at least one 
occurrence of the Undermining Adversarial Leadership code. 
The Undermining Adversarial Leadership Intensity Index of each speech 
and statement containing at least one occurrence of this code averaged approximately 
0.38.  Such excerpts by Bush had a significantly higher average Intensity Index than 
those by Obama at 0.42 and 0.21, respectively, making Undermining Adversarial 
Leadership the code with the highest relative weight given by Bush. 
As part of their messages aimed to undermine adversarial leadership, Bush 
and Obama used harsher and more direct language than was seen under the other codes.  
Both presidents described the actions of the adversary as “murder” (as depicted in Figure 
7), and they also often described the victims of terrorist attacks as “innocents,” or used a 
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comparable description to portray those targeted by violent extremists as regular people 
with whom their audience could relate.  For example, in his speech on the night of 
September 11, 2001, Bush referred to the victims of that day’s terrorist attacks as “in 
airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and Federal 
workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors.”102  In a similar message used when 
referencing the 9/11 attacks during his speech in Cairo in June 2009, Obama stated that, 
“Al Qaida killed nearly 3,000 people on that day. The victims were innocent men, 
women, and children from America and many other nations who had done nothing to 
harm anybody.”103  
 
Figure 7.   Word clouds providing a visualization of word frequency in excerpts from 
Bush, left, and Obama, right, which were assigned the Undermining Adversarial 
Leadership code.  
In addition, both presidents also pointed out that victims of violent terror 
were not only American, and often included Muslims.  Though these statements also 
served to establish common bonds with other countries, and therefore could have been 
coded as Cultivating Common Interests and Values, their primary message denigrated the 
actions of the violent extremists by bringing the damage closer to home for others: 
                                                 
102 George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” (speech, Washington, DC, 
September 11, 2001), accessed February 9, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-
book2/html/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1099.htm. 
103 Obama, “Remarks in Cairo.” 
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• “On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder 
on my country and took the lives of 67 British citizens.”104 
• “On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda murdered nearly 3,000 people 
on America's home soil. Some of the victims that day were 
innocent Muslims. And since then, al Qaeda and its allies have 
killed many more Muslims here in the Middle East -- including 
women and children.”105 
• “The victims were innocent men, women, and children from 
America and many other nations who had done nothing to harm 
anybody.”106 
• “They have killed in many countries. They have killed people of 
different faiths, but more than any other, they have killed 
Muslims.”107 
• “For years, al Qaeda and its affiliates have defiled a great religion 
of peace and justice, and ruthlessly murdered men, women and 
children of all nationalities and faiths. Indeed, above all, they have 
murdered Muslims. And these extremists have killed in Amman 
and Bali; Islamabad and Kabul; and they have the blood of 
Americans and Russians on their hands.”108 
• “Innocent civilians in America, in Indonesia and across the world 
are still targeted by violent extremism.”109 
• “Indeed, al Qaeda has slaughtered scores of Muslims in many 
countries, including our own.”110 
On multiple occasions, Bush also referred to the opposition to freedom by 
violent extremists.  These references included, for example, descriptions of the adversary 
as “terrorists who despise freedom's progress,”111 “followers of a clear and focused 
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ideology that hates freedom,”112 and “using terror to stop the spread of freedom.”113  In 
comparison, Obama never utilized the word “freedom” in any excerpt under the 
Undermining Adversarial Leadership code. 
As mentioned earlier, the presidents used the word “impose” in different 
contexts.  While Obama injected the word in messages aimed to counter perceptions that 
the United States was forcing its ideals upon other countries, Bush used the same word 
mainly when referring to the adversary:  
• “The world has suffered enough from fanatics who seek to impose 
their will through fear and murder.”114 
• “Their goal is to overthrow governments and to impose their 
totalitarian rule on millions.”115 
• “These extremists have hijacked the noble religion of Islam, and 
seek to impose their totalitarian ideology on millions.”116 
• “In Afghanistan under the Taliban, on Iraq's Anbar Province, they 
ruled by intimidation and murder. Their goal is to impose that 
same dark rule across the Middle East.”117 
c. Positive Vision Based on America’s Values 
The review of the sample selection resulted in 103 total excerpts that were 
coded as Positive Vision Based on America’s Values.  These excerpts were derived from 
33, or 66%, of the speeches and statements.  Specifically, this code was assigned to 70 
excerpts from 22, or 65%, of Bush speeches and statements and 33 excerpts from 11, or 
approximately 69%, of Obama speeches and statements.  As illustrated in Figure 8, this 
breakdown constituted the most consistent use of a message by both presidents. 
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Figure 8.   The percentage of speeches and statements that contained at least one 
occurrence of the Positive Vision Based on America’s Values code. 
The overall average Intensity Index for the Positive Vision Based on 
America’s Values code was 0.28, and also was comparable among the presidents.  The 
average Intensity Index for the use of this code in speeches and statements by Bush was 
0.30, while Obama’s relevant speeches had an average of 0.27.   
An examination of the excerpts under the Positive Vision Based on 
America’s Values code showed both similarities and differences in the presentation of 
these messages by each president.  The excerpts could be sorted into two primary themes, 
both used in varying amounts by each president: visionary messages based on democratic 
ideals, and direct descriptions of the system and people of the United States.  While both 
presidents utilized certain key words such as democracy, liberty, justice, and security to 
promote thoughts and ideas consistent with America’s values, the context and frequency 
in which the words were used differed.  On a much greater basis than Obama, as 
visualized in Figure 9, Bush often used such words to project a vision that described the 
benefits that could be experienced once other countries adopted a democratic system.  To 
convey this message, Bush demonstrated the close relationship between these words and 
concepts; for example, during a speech in Singapore in November 2006, Bush stated, “In 
the long run, the surest path to security is the expansion of liberty and freedom. History 
shows that free societies are peaceful societies. Democracies do not attack each other.”118  
Bush also put forth statements that demonstrated the resultant effects of democracy, such 
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as “Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance,”119 and “Democracy leads 
to justice within a nation, and the advance of democracy leads to greater security among 
nations.”120  While in Thailand in 2008, Bush best summed up this type of visionary 
message by stating, “We're also working to counter the hateful ideology of the extremists 
by promoting a more hopeful alternative, one based upon freedom and liberty.”121 
 
Figure 9.   Word clouds providing a visualization of word frequency in excerpts from 
Bush, left, and Obama, right, which were assigned the Positive Vision Based on 
America’s Values code.  
Many of the other excerpts under the Positive Vision Based on America’s 
Values code, and the majority of those originating from Obama, used direct references to 
America.  Obama described his reason for this type of message while in Burma in 
November 2012, stating, “I describe our system in the United States because that's how 
you must reach for the future that you deserve….”122  Instead of projecting a conceptual 
image utilizing words such as democracy, liberty, and justice, these messages utilized 
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those same words to describe the system and people of the United States, the freedoms 
and rights afforded to American citizens, and the ideal of the American dream: 
• “Yet there's a reason our Nation shines as a beacon of hope and 
opportunity, a reason many throughout the world dream of coming 
to America. It's because we're a free nation, where men and women 
have the opportunity to achieve their dreams. No matter your 
background or your circumstance of birth, in America you can get 
a good education; you can start your own business; you can raise a 
family; you can worship freely and help elect the leaders of your 
community and your country. You can support the policies of our 
Government, or you're free to openly disagree with them.”123 
• “The dream of opportunity for all people has not come true for 
everyone in America, but its promise exists for all who come to 
our shores, and that includes nearly 7 million American Muslims 
in our country today, who, by the way, enjoy incomes and 
educational levels that are higher than the American average.”124 
• “And I believe that America holds within her the truth that 
regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share 
common aspirations to live in peace and security, to get an 
education and to work with dignity, to love our families, our 
communities, and our God.”125 
• “But tonight, we are once again reminded that America can do 
whatever we set our mind to. That is the story of our history, 
whether it’s the pursuit of prosperity for our people, or the struggle 
for equality for all our citizens; our commitment to stand up for our 
values abroad, and our sacrifices to make the world a safer place. 
Let us remember that we can do these things not just because of 
wealth or power, but because of who we are: one nation, under 
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”126 
• “In the United States, for more than two centuries, we have worked 
to keep this promise for all of our citizens—to win freedom for 
those who were enslaved; to extend the right to vote for women 
and African Americans; to protect the rights of workers to 
organize.”127 
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• “The United States of America is a nation of Christians and Jews, 
and Muslims and Buddhists, and Hindus and non-believers. Our 
story is shaped by every language; it’s enriched by every culture. 
We have people from every corners of the world. We’ve tasted the 
bitterness of civil war and segregation, but our history shows us 
that hatred in the human heart can recede; that the lines between 
races and tribes fade away. And what’s left is a simple truth: e 
pluribus unum -- that’s what we say in America. Out of many, we 
are one nation and we are one people. And that truth has, time and 
again, made our union stronger. It has made our country stronger. 
It’s part of what has made America great. We amended our 
Constitution to extend the democratic principles that we hold 
dear.”128 
d. Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States 
The largest amount of excerpts was given the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code, with 333 of the 520 excerpts classified 
with this code.  A total of 43, or 86%, of the 50 sample speeches and statements 
contained excerpts with this code (Figure 10).  Of the 333 excerpts given this code, 173 
were attributed to Bush and 160 to Obama.  The excerpts from Bush appeared within 28, 
or approximately 82%, of his 34 sample speeches and statements, while Obama utilized 
this type of message in 15, or approximately 94%, of his 16 speeches and statements 
within the sample.  The only occasion in which Obama did not employ a Cultivating 
Common Interests and Values with the United States message was during his remarks 
upon the death of Usama Bin Laden.   
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Figure 10.   The percentage of speeches and statements that contained at least one 
occurrence of the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United 
States code. 
The analysis of the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the 
United States Intensity Index of each speech and statement containing at least one 
occurrence of this code revealed an overall average rating of approximately 0.69, 
demonstrating the highest relative weight given to a code.  Both presidents utilized 
messages of this type on a consistent and frequent basis throughout their years in office.  
The average Intensity Index of the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the 
United States code in speeches and statements by Bush was 0.64; for Obama, the average 
was 0.78.   
Excerpts given the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the 
United States code spanned the greatest number of themes within one code but also 
proved to contain the most consistent message among the presidents, as both men 
attempted to establish the commonalities shared by the audience with America. The ideas 
presented in these excerpts, as visualized in Figure 11, included historical and cultural 
themes; mutual enemies, threats, and challenges; and the universality of certain values, 
freedoms, and rights.   
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Figure 11.   Word clouds providing a visualization of word frequency in excerpts from 
Bush, left, and Obama, right, which were assigned the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code.  
As mentioned earlier, both presidents frequently began speeches with a 
reference about the host country that often included anecdotes of previous positive 
interaction and coordination between the host country and the United States.  By doing 
so, they demonstrated an enduring long-term connection between the countries.  On some 
occasions, both presidents also traced the ancestral and cultural roots of American 
citizens to the host country and noted their contributions to American society; for 
example, in Beijing, China, in February 2002, Bush noted that the United States is “home 
to 2.3 million Americans of Chinese ancestry, who can be found working in the offices of 
our corporations or in the Cabinet of the President of the United States or skating for the 
American Olympic team.”129  Similarly, in Cairo in June 2009, Obama spoke of the 
contributions of American Muslims, stating, “They have fought in our wars; they have 
served in our government; they have stood for civil rights; they have started businesses; 
they have taught at our universities; they’ve excelled in our sports arenas; they’ve won 
Nobel prizes, built our tallest building, and lit the Olympic torch.”130   
On several occasions, both Bush and Obama highlighted the similar 
multiethnic cultures of the United States and the country in which they were speaking.  
Bush made note of this cultural characteristic when speaking in Russia in May 2002 and 
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described its significance by stating, “In a multiethnic society, people must work toward 
tolerance and reject extremism. It's important in America, just like it's important here in 
Russia. And this is a multiethnic society, to the credit of Russia, just like America is a 
multiethnic society, which makes our country strong.”131  Likewise, in Indonesia in 
November 2010, Obama stated, “We are two nations, which have traveled different 
paths.  Yet our nations show that hundreds of millions who hold different beliefs can be 
united in freedom under one flag.”132  
Both presidents sometimes presented a corresponding theme describing 
the challenges faced by America on its way to becoming a society respectful of the rights 
of all its citizens.  Within these messages, the presidents called attention to the struggles 
the United States experienced in its history and the similarities with the current 
challenges of other nations.  For example, in Turkey in June 2004, Bush stated, 
“Achieving these commitments of democracy can require decades of effort and reform. 
In my own country, it took generations to throw off slavery, racial segregation, and other 
practices that violated our ideals. So we do not expect that other societies can be 
transformed in a day.”133  Likewise, in Latvia in May 2005, Bush stated, “For my own 
country, the process of becoming a mature, multiethnic democracy was lengthy and 
violent.  Our journey from national independence to justice included the enslavement of 
millions and a 4-year civil war.”134  In Brazil in March 2011, Obama put forth a similar 
message, stating, “On the streets of the United States, men and women marched and bled 
and some died so that every citizen could enjoy the same freedoms and opportunities—no 
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2011, Obama put forth a similar message, stating, “When we strove to blot out the stain 
of slavery and advance the rights of man, we found common cause with your struggles 
against oppression.”136 
Within the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United 
States code, Bush and Obama also detailed common enemies, threats, and global 
challenges.  Very often, Bush and Obama highlighted violent extremists as a common 
adversary and also discussed other global threats faced by nations, to include nuclear, 
economic, and environmental threats: 
• “The Soviet Union is gone, but freedom still has enemies. We're 
threatened by terrorism. Bred within failed states, it's present 
within our own cities. We're threatened by the spread of chemical 
and biological and nuclear weapons which are produced by outlaw 
regimes and could be delivered either by missile or terrorist 
cell.”137 
• “The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. And we must work together to stop 
proliferation.”138 
• “We face terrorist networks that rejoice when parents bury their 
murdered children or rejoice when bound men plead for mercy. 
We face outlaw regimes that give aid and shelter to these killers 
and seek weapons of mass murder. We face the challenges of 
corruption and poverty and disease, which throw whole nations 
into chaos and despair.”139 
• “Building more hopeful societies means working together to 
confront the challenges that face the entire region. Open markets 
and the entrepreneurial spirit have set off historic economic booms 
in Asia. This economic growth creates new opportunities, and yet 
we've got to recognize it creates new challenges. We must find the 
energy to power our growing economies. We must counter the risk 
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of pandemic disease. And we must bring more people into the 
circle of development and prosperity.”140 
• “Think of the issues that will define your lives: security from 
nuclear weapons and extremism; access to markets and 
opportunity; health and the environment; an international system 
that protects sovereignty and human rights, while promoting 
stability and prosperity.”141 
• “For whether it's the recession or climate change, or terrorism or 
drug trafficking, poverty or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
we have learned that without a doubt, there's no quarter of the 
globe that can wall itself off from the threats of the 21st 
century.”142 
• “Together, we must confront climate change by ending the world's 
dependence on fossil fuels, by tapping the power of new sources of 
energy like the wind and sun, and calling upon all nations to do 
their part.”143 
On multiple occasions, when speaking to members or prospective 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both presidents invoked the 
bond of its members and its ethos of common enemies by citing NATO’s Article 5, “An 
attack on one is an attack on all.”144  
Another consistent message appearing throughout the excerpts under the 
Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States code was the 
universality of freedom and human rights.  Both presidents routinely spoke of the 
collective right of all people to enjoy certain ideals and freedoms, such as the right to 
practice their chosen religion:  
• “We hold dear what our Declaration of Independence says, that all 
have got unalienable rights, endowed by a Creator--not endowed 
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by the ones who wrote the Declaration of Independence but by a 
Creator, a universal Creator.”145 
• We'll be judged by history on how we defend our freedoms. We'll 
be judged in history by how we help our people prosper and grow. 
And we'll be judged by history as to whether or not we defend the 
universal values that are right and just and true.”146 
• “In the 21st century, freedom is an Asian value because it is a 
universal value.”147 
• “I just want to assure you of one thing, that I believe that freedom 
is universal. I don't think freedom is just a right for American 
citizens. I don't think it's just a right for people who practice 
religion one way. I think it is the right of everybody who lives 
everywhere.”148 
• “The desire for liberty is universal, because it is written by our 
Creator into the hearts of every man, woman, and child on this 
Earth.”149 
• “I assured them that the United States of America cares about the 
form of government in Russia, that we believe in the universal 
values embedded in democracy. We believe in rule of law; we 
believe in human rights; we believe everybody has a right to be 
treated equally.”150 
• “We recognize that every democracy will reflect the unique culture 
and history of its people. Yet we recognize that there are universal 
freedoms, that there are God-given rights for every man, woman, 
and child on the face of this Earth.”151 
• “First, because, for all our differences, there are certain values that 
bind us together and reveal our common humanity: the universal 
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longing to live a life free from fear and free from want, a life 
marked by dignity and respect and simple justice.”152 
• “But it is our commitment to certain universal values which allows 
us to correct our imperfections, to improve constantly, and to grow 
stronger over time.”153 
• “That's why America seeks an international system that lets nations 
pursue their interests peacefully, especially when those interests 
diverge; a system where the universal rights of human beings are 
respected, and violations of those rights are opposed; a system 
where we hold ourselves to the same standards that we apply to 
other nations, with clear rights and responsibilities for all.”154 
• “These freedoms of expression and worship—of access to 
information and political participation—we believe are universal 
rights. They should be available to all people, including ethnic and 
religious minorities—whether they are in the United States, China, 
or any nation.”155 
• “Hand in hand, that is what development and democracy are 
about—the notion that certain values are universal. Prosperity 
without freedom is just another form of poverty. Because there are 
aspirations that human beings share—the liberty of knowing that 
your leader is accountable to you, and that you won’t be locked up 
for disagreeing with them; the opportunity to get an education and 
to be able to work with dignity; the freedom to practice your faith 
without fear or restriction. Those are universal values that must be 
observed everywhere.”156 
• “But we also know that there’s certain aspirations shared by every 
human being: We all seek to be free. We all seek to be heard. We 
all yearn to live without fear or discrimination. We all yearn to 
choose how we are governed. And we all want to shape our own 
destiny. These are not American ideals or Brazilian ideals. These 
are not Western ideals. These are universal rights, and we must 
support them everywhere.”157 
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• “But what we’ve learned in the United States is that there are 
certain principles that are universal, apply to everybody no matter 
what you look like, no matter where you come from, no matter 
what religion you practice.”158 
4. Comparison of Codes by Types of Remarks 
The usage of codes and their corresponding Intensity Indexes can also be 
analyzed based on the type of remarks in which the messages appeared.  As illustrated in 
Table 3, the frequency and relative weight of codes varied between the two types of 
remarks.  The Countering Perceptions code appeared on a much greater basis within 
speeches (49%) than in statements in response to a significant national security event, 
such as a terrorist attack involving American citizens or interests or the death of an 
adversary (9%); however, both types of remarks gave messages within this code a low 
relative weight with average Intensity Indexes of 0.13 and 0.14, respectively. 
 
  Speeches Statements in Response 
to National Security 
Event 
Countering Perceptions Percentage of 
speeches/statements 
with at least one 
occurrence of code 
49% 9% 





with at least one 
occurrence of code 
33% 90% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.14 0.70 




with at least one 
occurrence of code 
69% 55% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.23 0.47 
Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values 
with the United States 
Percentage of 
speeches/statements 
with at least one 
occurrence of code 
100% 36% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.73 0.24 
Table 3.   Breakdown of codes appearing in each type of remarks, including the percentage 
of speeches/statements with at least one occurrence of the code and the average 
Intensity Index for each code. 
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The primary message of planned speeches in front of a foreign audience was 
based on Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States, with 100% of 
the speeches including at least one excerpt under this code.  The corresponding average 
Intensity Index for the Cultivating Common Interests and Values with the United States 
code within these speeches was the highest of any code at 0.73.   
Only 36% of statements made by the presidents in response to a significant 
national security event, such as a terrorist attack involving American citizens or interests 
or the death of an adversary, contained at least one excerpt with the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code.  Instead, these remarks focused on 
messages aimed to undermine the adversary.  Such statements exhibited both a high 
frequency (90%) and relative weight (0.70) of the Undermining Adversarial Leadership 
code. 
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III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to 
be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that. 
 
Edward R. Murrow159 
 
The examination of the 50 selected speeches and statements revealed numerous 
common themes throughout the messages presented by both presidents over the course of 
the last decade.  Though each president also discussed various topics that fell outside of 
the areas addressed by this research, the defined categories of coding utilized for this 
analysis amply captured the messages put forth by the presidents in support of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts and therefore allow for answers to the research questions posed 
in this thesis. 
A. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MESSAGE DELIVERED BY U.S. 
PRESIDENTS TO FOREIGN AUDIENCES SINCE THE 9/11 TERRORIST 
ATTACKS? 
Based on the review of speeches and statements as well as the analysis of the 
frequency and relative weight afforded to each code, the research determined the message 
delivered by the presidents to foreign audiences since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to be of a 
primarily narrative nature.  As shown in Figure 12, less than half of all speeches and 
statements contained excerpts of a counter narrative nature (either Countering 
Perceptions or Undermining Adversarial Leadership); rather, the majority of the remarks 
included at least one occurrence of a narrative message with 86% containing excerpts 
with the Common Interests and Values with the United States code and 66% containing 
excerpts with the Positive Vision Based on America's Values code.  Within the speeches 
and statements containing these codes, the excerpts with the Common Interests and 
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Values with the United States code were given a greater relative weight (0.69) compared 
to those with the Positive Vision Based on America's Values code (0.28). 
 
Figure 12.   Categories of codes used for analysis, the percentage of speeches/statements 
containing each code, and the average Intensity Index (II) of each code.  
Though only 46% of all speeches and statements contained messages of 
Undermining Adversarial Leadership, this code held a relative high weight with an 
average Intensity Index of 0.38.  As seen in the comparison of codes by type of remarks, 
however, this greater weight can be attributed to the much higher use of this code within 
statements made by the presidents in response to a national security event.  
B. HAS THE NATURE OF THIS MESSAGE DIFFERED BETWEEN 
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS? 
Overall, the message delivered to foreign audiences by Bush and Obama was 
relatively consistent.  The message utilized with the greatest frequency and given the 
greatest relative weight by both presidents were those under the Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values with the United States code, as illustrated in Table 4, although 
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Obama employed this type of message more than Bush.  Both presidents employed 
messages of Countering Perceptions and Positive Vision Based on America’s Values on a 
comparable basis and with a similar relative weight. 
 
  Bush Obama 
Countering Perceptions Percentage of 
speeches/statements 
with at least one 
occurrence of code 
35% 40% 





with at least one 
occurrence of code 
56% 25% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.42 0.21 




with at least one 
occurrence of code 
65% 69% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.30 0.27 
Cultivating Common 
Interests and Values 
with the United States 
Percentage of 
speeches/statements 
with at least one 
occurrence of code 
82% 94% 
 Average Intensity Index 0.64 0.78 
Table 4.   Breakdown of codes by president, including the percentage of 
speeches/statements with at least one occurrence of the code and the average 
Intensity Index for each code. 
The primary difference between the administrations was in regard to the code of 
Undermining Adversarial Leadership.  This type of message was the only code used with 
greater frequency and given a higher relative weight by Bush than Obama.  
C. CAN THIS MESSAGE BE MODIFIED TO BETTER SUPPORT U.S. 
EFFORTS TO COMBAT VIOLENT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, AND IF SO, 
HOW? 
This research demonstrated that the United States puts forth messages of its own 
narrative with higher frequency and relative weight than messages of a counter narrative 
nature.  The United States should continue its efforts to present its own narrative; 
however, to achieve a more effective holistic approach to public diplomacy and strategic 
communication, it should also take greater advantage of opportunities to increase its use 
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of counter narrative messages that contest perceptions and undermine the adversary.  
While the presidents have utilized such messages in their responses to national security 
events, the counter narrative can be employed on more occasions.  The value of such 
messages is supported by previous studies of individuals who have left terrorist 
organizations.160  These studies have provided a greater understanding of the de-
radicalization process, or the process through which individuals depart from violent 
Islamic extremist organizations and denounce their associated beliefs.  The motivations 
involved in the start of this process were found to include disillusionment with the 
organization’s tactics and strategies, loss of respect for the group’s leadership, and the 
occurrence of a traumatic event that preceded the decision to reject violence (this 
experience may not only be defined as a personal physical injury but as emotional or 
mental distress as well).161  Any of these precipitating beliefs or events can trigger a 
cognitive opening through which new and different ideas are received.  The United States 
can foster these motivations, and exploit potential resulting cognitive openings, by 
promoting messages of a counter narrative nature. 
The United States also can take additional steps to strengthen its counterterrorism 
efforts through strategic communication.  Building on previous public diplomacy 
strategies that stressed the need to empower moderate Muslim voices but did not explain 
the full meaning or intent of this empowerment, the U.S. government should gain the 
insight of these partners to craft messages that will have the greatest impact on other 
cultures.  For example, the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and 
Strategic Communication advised government officials to “avoid using religious 
language, because it can mean different things and is easily misconstrued;”162 however, 
the absence of religious language could also be dangerously misconstrued by creating the 
                                                 
160 Michael Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons,” 75. 
161 Michael Jacobson, “Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining from Al-Qa’ida’s Losses,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 8 
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Kim Cragin, 299-322 (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2009). 
162 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
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impression that Americans lack faith.163  Coordination throughout the public diplomacy 
process by the U.S. government with individuals who have expertise in Muslim and Arab 
culture could draw attention to such perceptions as well as avoid the use of potentially 
damaging language.   
In addition, the U.S. government should also encourage similar messaging from 
counterparts in other countries, in order to present a united voice to effectively combat 
the ideology of violent Islamic extremists.  Strong international partnerships can help to 
reinforce valuable themes, thereby increasing global assistance in counterterrorism efforts 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic 
world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.  
 
9/11 Commission Report164 
 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The use of public diplomacy is an essential component of counterterrorism efforts 
but, to date, the United States has not been as effective in its attempts to utilize strategic 
communication against the threat of violent Islamic extremism as it has been in its 
utilization of military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources.  Since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, public diplomacy policies and proposals of the U.S. government have 
been criticized, found to be ineffective, and been the subject of continuous overhaul.165 
Based upon the idea that a retrospective analysis of previous presidential speeches 
could provide guidance for future strategic communications of U.S. government officials, 
this thesis identified the nature of the message delivered by U.S. Presidents to foreign 
audiences since the 9/11 attacks through an analysis of a purposeful sampling of 50 
speeches and statements.  The analysis examined the position of the United States 
Government in the ideological debate with violent Islamic extremists to determine 
whether the United States has taken a largely defensive stance, in which the United States 
constantly strives to counter the narrative of violent extremist adversaries, or a more 
forward-leaning posture, in which the United States remains primarily concerned with 
presenting its own narrative based on its values and ideals.   
If asked to provide a hypothesis prior to embarking upon this research, this writer 
would have stated that the United States needed to focus more on messaging its own 
beliefs and values rather than responding to the narrative of the violent extremists.  As 
evidenced by this analysis, however, the United States has in fact been promoting its own 
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377. 
165 Paul, “Whither Strategic Communication?” iii. 
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message.  A majority of remarks by the presidents were found to include at least one 
occurrence of a narrative message, either projecting a positive vision based on America’s 
values or establishing common interests and values with other countries.  The presidents 
utilized a counter narrative message, aimed to counter perceptions or undermine the 
adversary, with less frequency.  
The recommendations based on the results of this analysis therefore endorse 
greater use of counter narrative themes that directly confront the ideology of violent 
Islamic extremists.  Employing such messages would provide the United States with a 
more comprehensive strategy, corresponding with the three-pronged hybrid approach 
advocated in the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication which consists of messages that offer a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity, rooted in America’s most basic values; isolate and undermine violent 
extremists; and cultivate common interests and values between Americans and people 
throughout the world.166   
In addition to the recommendation to modify this message by more consistently 
including messages aimed at countering perceptions and undermining the adversary, the 
United States can take additional steps to strengthen its public diplomacy strategy 
through greater coordination with Muslim partners as well as with other governments.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research conducted in furtherance of this thesis leads to other possible 
avenues of interest for future research opportunities.  First, though this research did not 
uncover any apparent geographic trends in messaging, additional examination is 
warranted to determine whether any patterns or differences exist among geographic 
regions in which the message is delivered.  Additional research and analysis, based on the 
same factors evaluated in this thesis, of the public communications of other senior U.S. 
officials would also be valuable in determining the consistency of the message being 
delivered throughout the government.  Lastly, an analysis of foreign media coverage of 
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international speeches and statements by the president and other U.S. government 
officials would provide a valuable view of the perception and local impact of the 
remarks. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate adversary of the United States in the counterterrorism arena is not 
the individual who carries out attacks against America; instead, it is the radical violent 
ideology that compels such action.167  Absent a strong strategic communication plan 
within its national security strategy, the United States will lose the ideological battle 
against violent Islamic extremists.  The United States must remain an active participant in 
this debate, and must commit to a persuasive and consistent message to challenge and 
defeat this ideology.  
As stated by the 9/11 Commission, the United States must aggressively define 
itself; if not, the extremists will seize the opportunity to do so and will provide their own 
characterization of America.  This thesis has shown that the United States is indeed 
defining itself through its own narrative based on its values and commonalities with other 
countries; however, now it must also directly counter the violent extremist ideology.  
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